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Abstract 
This paper explores the potential future need for fault current 
??????????? ??? ???? ????? ???er system, and some of the 
technical implications of this change.  It is estimated that 
approximately 300-400 distribution substations will require 
fault current limitation, based on the statistical analysis of the 
projected ?????????????????????? (or violation).  The analysis 
uses a UK electrical system scenario that satisfies the 
????????????? ??????? ???? ??? ???? ???? ??? ??2 emissions by 
2050.  A case study involving the connection of distributed 
generation (DG) via a superconducting fault current limiter 
(SFCL) is used to illustrate the potential protection and 
control issues.  In particular, DG fault ride-through, auto-
reclosure schemes, and transformer inrush current can be 
problematic for SFCLs that require a recovery period.  The 
potential solutions to these issues are discussed, such as the 
use of islanding or automation to reduce the fault level. 
1 Introduction 
Utility electrical distribution systems require new solutions to 
address the problems presented by increased fault current 
levels due to the connection of distributed generation (DG) 
and energy storage.  There are several methods of reducing 
fault currents [2]; this paper focuses on the resistive 
superconducting fault current limiter (SFCL).  The future 
need for fault current limitation in distribution networks is 
statistically analysed, based on the projected fault level 
"headroom" (or violation).  An increased presence of DG and 
fault current limitation in the electrical system requires close 
examination of the system-wide integration issues, 
particularly for protection and control schemes, such as fault 
ride-through and auto-reclosure.  An important theme of this 
paper is the problem of the recovery time of resistive SFCLs 
and how it impacts protection, as well as potential solutions. 
2 Analysis of need for fault current limitation 
2.1 Summary of analysis method
The present-day fault level headroom is derived from publicly 
available five-year plan documents for three UK distribution 
network operators (DNOs).  In this analysis, DNOs A and B 
???????? ??? ???????????? ????? ???? ???? ?? ??? ??????? ????????-
????????? ? ???? ????????? ??? ??????????? ????? ?witchgear 
equipment ratings minus RMS break fault levels.  The mean 
and standard deviation of the headroom at each voltage level, 
for each DNO, are calculated.  Data from different DNOs are 
merged and the number of substations (nodes) is scaled to 
approximate a UK-wide scenario. 
 
A future scenario for UK generation to satisfy the 
????????????? ??????? ???? ??? ???? ???? ??? ??2 emissions by 
2050 [12] is established, including the required DG and 
energy storage, and their distribution in the electrical system.  
However, this scenario may be idealistic and is simply 
indicative of the possible impact of generation on fault levels.  
The increase in mean fault level (and corresponding decrease 
in mean headroom) due to the future scenario is calculated.  A 
DG connection at a single node may also raise the fault level 
at neighbouring nodes.  To model this effect, it has been 
estimated that any DG installation increases the fault current, 
on average, at 1.5 nodes?????????????????????????????????????
??????? ???defined as the actual number of nodes divided by 
1.5.  The percentage of power system substations which are 
likely to have negative fault level headroom, hence requiring 
some form of fault current limitation, is statistical analysed. 
2.2 Results 
Figure 1 illustrates the fault level relative to circuit breaker 
(CB) rating for DNO A.  At both 11 kV and 33 kV, DNO A 
was found to have the worst mean fault level headroom, 6.7 
kA and 6.9 kA respectively.  Table 1 summarises the overall 
headroom for all DNOs.  The weighted averages of existing 
"over-stressed" nodes are 2.5% for 11 kV and 1.4% for 33 
kV. 
 
Figure 1: RMS break fault level as a percentage of CB rating, 
for DNO A at 33 kV 
 11 kV 33 kV 
Total valid nodes 1147 698 
Fault level mean (% of CB rating) 48.6% 47.1% 
3-phase fault level mean 7.1 kA 8.0 kA 
3-phase fault level std. dev. 3.0 kA 4.0 kA 
Mean CB rating 15.0 kA 17.9 kA 
Mean headroom 7.9 kA 9.9 kA 
Table 1: Summary of fault level headroom (averages for all 
DNOs, weighted by relative peak demand) 
 
The UK 2050 scenario used in this paper requires 
approximately 59.2 GWa (gigawatt-years) of electrical 
energy.  This is significantly higher than the 2007 demand of 
39 GWa (342 TWh), due to the impact of electric vehicles 
(EVs) and the increased use of electricity for space heating 
(using heat pumps where appropriate, displacing natural gas 
use).  Assuming an average load factor of 0.83 (if heating, 
EV-charging, and electrolysis loads can be managed, via 
demand response and real-time pricing, to have load factors 
of 1) and a transmission and distribution efficiency of 91%, 
there is a peak electrical demand of 70.9 GW (at the end user) 
or 77.9 GW at generation.  In this scenario, 25.5 GWa would 
????? ????? ?????????????? ??????????? ????????? ???? ????
remaining 33.7 GWa from renewable or sustainable sources 
(or energy storage).  The derivation of these values is beyond 
the scope of this paper.  An estimated split of renewable 
generation sources, and their assumed capacity factors, is 
shown in Table 2. 
 
 % required 
from each 
source 
Capacity 
factor 
Total 
energy 
required 
Peak 
capacity 
Wind 60.0% 0.35 22.7 GWa 64.9 GW 
Tidal 20.0% 0.42 7.8 GWa 18.6 GW 
Wave 10.0% 0.35 4.1 GWa 11.7 GW 
Solar 5.0% 0.12 2.7 GWa 22.2 GW 
Despatchable 
renewables 
(Biomass etc.) 
5.0% 0.60 1.9 GWa 3.1 GW 
Storage N/A 0.25 5.1 GWa 20.5 GW 
Table 2: Peak capacities of renewable generation and storage 
to meet 2050 targets 
 
In the worst case scenario where only despatchable renewable 
sources are available (3.1 GW), and given a despatchable 
(non-renewable) peak capacity of 54.3 GW, the minimum 
peak capacity of energy storage must be 20.5 GW.  
Considering an average capacity factor of 0.25 for storage 
devices and an assumed average efficiency of 59% for the 
energy storage process, 5.1 GWa of energy must pass through 
storage, with losses of 2.1 GWa.  Hence, a total of 39.1 GWa 
(33.7÷0.91 + 2.1) must be provided from sustainable sources. 
 
 Symmetrical per-unit short-circuit current infeed 
 11 kV 33 kV 132 kV 
Synchronous 3-8 (direct connected) 
3-8 (direct 
connected) 
2.5-4.5 (always 
via a transformer) 
DFIG 1.0-2.0 (direct connected) 
1.0-2.0 (direct 
connected) 
1.0-1.5 (always 
via a transformer) 
Inverter 1.0-2.0  (direct connected) 
1.0-2.0  (possibly 
direct connected) 
1.0-1.5 (always 
via a transformer) 
Table 3: Ranges of symmetrical fault level in-feeds for 
different interface types 
 
The mix of generation-to-grid interfaces is important for 
estimating the likely fault current contributions from DG.  
Wind sources commonly use a double fed induction generator 
(DFIG) interface.  Tidal, wave, solar, and storage sources are 
typically inverter-interfaced, with the exception of hydro 
generation and compressed-air which are synchronous.  
Despatchable renewables are also assumed to be synchronous 
generators.  The typical fault level in-feed ranges, adapted 
from [6], are shown in Table 3; the mean and standard 
deviation values of each range are used in the analysis. 
 
 11 kV 33 kV 132 kV 
Wind, Tidal, Wave, and Biomass, etc. 30% 50% 20% 
Solar 80% 20% 0% 
Storage 30% 30% 40% 
Table 4: Likely split of new generation/storage capacities at 
each connection voltage 
 
Given the estimated split of generation connection voltages in 
Table 4, the mean fault level increase per node at each voltage 
level can be determined.  The mean headroom minus the 
mean contribution from each renewable generation interface 
type, at each ??????????????????, is calculated; the normally 
distributed variables are combined.  The probability of nodes 
being overstressed (possessing negative headroom) can be 
calculated using one minus the cumulative normal 
distribution function (shown in Equation (1), where x is the 
value of interest divided by the standard deviation). 
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2
2
1
?
 (1) 
Multiplying the resulting probabilities by the number of nodes 
in the UK, at each voltage level, estimates the number of 
substations which may require fault current limitation, as 
summarised in Table 5.  The analysis was repeated to 
consider DNOs A and B only, to exclude ????????rural bias. 
 
 All three DNOs DNOs A and B 
11 kV 33 kV 11 kV 33 kV 
Approx. percentage of 
nodes with negative 
headroom 
5.2% 1.0% 5.9% 1.9% 
Number of potentially 
affected nodes in the 
UK 
282 42 320 75 
Table 5: Potential UK-wide requirement for fault current 
limitation, at 11 kV and 33 kV 
2.3  Assumptions and discussion 
The results illustrate that a significant number of UK 
substations, particularly at 11 kV, may require fault current 
limitation.  Other countries faced with similar future DG 
connection may have similar issues with fault levels, 
indicating a worldwide market for SFCLs. 
 
The analysis in this paper does not include specialist fault 
current limiter applications such as DC networks or marine 
vessel power systems.  L????? ????????????? ??? ?????????
storage systems is not considered, even though the number of 
required installations required to meet 2050 targets is high; an 
even spread is assumed.  Clustering would increase the fault 
level at individual nodes, but the number of nodes affected 
would reduce.  Thus, an assumed homogeneous spread of 
DG/storage probably leads to a reasonably accurate estimate.  
This analysis does not account for new substations which may 
be needed to support the significant electrical demand 
increase, or the potential to purchase cheaper switchgear with 
a lower fault current rating (e.g., 16 kA instead of 25 kA) if 
SFCLs are used.  T??? ??????????????????????????s, such as 
the potential for increased security of supply, increased power 
quality, and perhaps reduced losses (because of the reduced 
system impedance due to increased interconnection) is not 
evaluated.  However, an SFCL may itself add electrical losses 
and operational costs; these have also been ignored. 
 
Many of these simplifications are justified as being relatively 
small compared to the variability of the viable cost of an 
SFCL.  This can be estimated, although very approximately, 
from the range of costs of competing solutions for managing 
fault levels [5], [6].  If SFCLs can be offered at the lower cost 
levels, their adoption is likely to be high. 
3 Technical issues with fault current limitation 
The protection and control issues described in this section all 
relate to the inherent operation of an SFCL during a fault, or 
any system transient that leads to current in excess of the 
????????????????? ????????? ???????? ?????.  During a fault, the 
superconductor in a resistive SFCL will rapidly transit from 
the superconducting state to a resistive state.  However, up to 
several minutes may be required for recovery to the 
superconducting state [10].  It is assumed that the SFCL 
should be removed from service during this period; however 
the possibility of recovery under load (RUL) is being 
explored [9].  The potential for SFCLs to interfere with the 
operation of overcurrent and distance protection schemes has 
been discussed in [2], [7], [8]; this paper will focus on other 
issues relevant to utilities. 
 
A case study network has been used to demonstrate the 
protection issues for a DG connection via an SFCL, as 
illustrated in Figure 2.  It is assumed that the DG would 
increase the fault level in the local vicinity to a level beyond 
the rating of existing switchgear, and hence the SFCL is 
necessary to curb the generator????????????????????????????  It is 
also assumed that circuit breakers are installed on each feeder, 
and isolators are located in series with the SFCL.  The SFCL 
may also be installed on the generator side of the connecting 
transformer. 
 
Note that simple scenarios are considered in this paper and 
other factors may need to be considered in detail, such as: 
power quality; undervoltage and underfrequency protection; 
the type of distributed generation and whether it is centrally 
despatchable or not; regulatory issues; and the stability of the 
DG/islanded system (such as lack of voltage control and loss 
of synchronism) as well as the grid.  Other SFCL locations 
are also likely [2], [10].  In particular, the bus-tie location, as 
described in [3], is expected to minimise the effects of SFCLs 
on existing protection systems [2], as well as significantly 
reducing fault currents. 
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Figure 2: DG connected to the grid via an SFCL 
3.1 SFCL issues for remote faults 
The requirement for DG ride-through during remote faults 
may be problematic for systems that incorporate SFCLs.  
First, considering a permanent fault at F1 in Figure 2, which 
is assumed to be on an underground cable feeder, the DG may 
be required to ride-through this disturbance while the fault is 
cleared by the appropriate network protection scheme.  
However, the SFCL may operate, which (although necessary) 
consequently requires disconnection of the SFCL (and DG) 
for recovery.  There are several potential solutions to this 
problem: 
 
? An SFCL that does not require a recovery period could 
be used, such as a DC-biased pre-saturated iron-core 
device [10]. 
? Faster-acting protection schemes could help reduce the 
energy absorbed by the SFCL and potentially reduce its 
recovery time.  However, circuit breaker operation time 
(several cycles) relative to SFCL operation time (sub-
cycle) may diminish the net benefit achieved by 
reducing fault detection and location times. 
? The act of removing the faulted feeder from service 
(e.g., the feeder with fault F1 in Figure 2) may reduce 
the fault level at the 33 kV busbar, thereby allowing the 
SFCL to remain out of service while recovering (with 
the normally-open bypass being used to enable the DG 
to remain in service).  Furthermore, before activating the 
bypass, network automation could manipulate normally-
open/closed points to reduce the prevailing fault level 
(possibly at the expense of security of supply and power 
quality) [6].  This would also allow the SFCL to be 
removed from service for maintenance.  Such a scheme 
may require relatively low-latency communications 
between intelligent electronic devices (IEDs) throughout 
the system. 
? As described earlier, SFCLs may be able to recover 
under load.  The option for RUL will help SFCLs to 
gain favour with utilities [9], but many system-wide 
effects must be studied, such as the extent and duration 
of the voltage drop across the SFCL during recovery. 
? Energy storage could potentially be integrated with 
protection to support loads during the recovery time. 
? It may be deemed acceptable to remove the DG (and 
shed some loads, if required) during SFCL recovery, 
because such faults are rare and some disturbance 
should be expected. 
 
Second, many faults on distribution-level overhead lines are 
transient in nature and hence supply can often successfully be 
restored by automatic reclosing schemes [1].  Multi-shot 
reclose schemes may also be used on distribution lines, 
particularly if there is a high occurrence of semi-permanent 
faults.  The requirement for reclosure capability further 
complicates the issues described for DG fault ride-through 
with fault current limitation. 
 
For transient or semi-permanent faults, such as F2 in Figure 2, 
the SFCL will become resistive and limit the fault current 
during the protection operating time of the initial trip (see 
Figure 3).  However, the SFCL may not recover to the 
superconducting state during the dead time, therefore 
delaying supply restoration unduly.  Although increased dead 
time may increase the chance of a successful reclosure 
(because the arc has longer to de-ionise, which is increasingly 
important at higher voltages), it is unlikely that typical dead 
times (perhaps several seconds at most [1], [4]) will be 
sufficient to permit SFCL recovery. 
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closed
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Figure 3: Comparison of simplified reclosure times for a 
transient fault 
 
Further potential solutions to SFCL issues during transient 
faults include: 
 
? In some cases the DG must be disconnected during the 
dead time, regardless of the desirable ride-through or 
reclosing strategy, to prevent damage due to out-of-sync 
reclosure [4].  Alternatively, the subsystem could 
???????? ?????????? ???? ??????? ????????-open bypass 
could be closed to supply the local loads from the DG.  
This assumes that the DG is necessary to supply the 
local loads, to prevent load shedding.  Islanding should 
prevent fault level violations, and the island can be 
reconnected to the grid when the SFCL recovers (by 
attempting to reclose on the faulted feeder).  Clearly 
many other issues exist with islanding, particularly 
resynchronisation with the grid. 
? An additional SFCL in its superconducting state (or 
another element in a dual-element unit) could be 
connected during the dead time.  This may significantly 
increase capital and operational costs, and may still be 
insufficient to support multi-shot reclosure schemes. 
? A resistive or reactive SFCL bypass could also reduce 
???? ????? ?????? ?????? ?????????????? ???? ???? ???????????
voltage drop may be unsatisfactory; there may also be 
overheating problems.  However, the voltage drop could 
be compensated with a tap changer transformer managed 
by a local automation scheme. 
3.2 Protection mal-operation by non-fault transients 
The large currents seen during non-fault transients, such as 
transformer inrush and motor starts, could cause SFCLs to 
operate spuriously [11].  Transformer protection uses 
harmonic restraint to block trips during inrush [1]; this is not 
relevant for SFCLs.  In some circumstances it may be 
desirable to dampen inrush with an SFCL, but the current 
should not be sufficient to require recovery to the 
superconducting state [3], [11]. 
  
  
Figure 4: Typical inrush current with DG disconnected (top) 
and with islanding (bottom) 
 
For a simple radial network such as Figure 2, the effect of 
transformer inrush was simulated for a ?black start? of the 
network (i.e., reconnection of the grid infeed), with and 
without DG connected.  Figure 4 shows the currents for a 
black start at 0.3 seconds at (a) a grid infeed transformer (at 
the 33 kV side), and (b) the 33 kV bus.  However, if DG is 
allowed to continue to supply loads (i.e., islanding is 
permitted), the corresponding ??????? ?????? currents are 
shown in (c) and (d).  Clearly, the inrush currents are 
significantly reduced, because the 33/11 kV transformers 
remain energised.  Note that a very high DG penetration is 
assumed, to help model local DG clustering. 
 
Figure 5 shows that transformer inrush and certain faults can 
produce a similar peak current magnitude and DC offset.  
Hence, SFCLs have the potential to operate spuriously in 
response to transformer inrush current, albeit under relatively 
extreme situations.  In this case, an SFCL at the 33 kV bus 
must be designed with a critical current that avoids operation 
for such currents (from 11 kV faults), and should only operate 
for faults at the 33 kV level which can result in peak fault 
current of approximately 18.2 kA, as shown in Figure 6. 
(c) (d) 
(a) (b) 
 
Figure 5: Inrush current at grid infeed compared with a 3-
phase to earth fault at an 11 kV bus (without DG) 
 
 
Figure 6: Inrush current at grid infeed compared with a 3-
phase to earth fault at the 33 kV bus (without DG) 
4 Conclusions 
The statistical analysis presented in this paper illustrates the 
potential need for fault current limiters in the UK ? perhaps 
several hundred devices ? and alludes to a significant 
worldwide market. 
 
SFCLs can complicate existing protection and control 
schemes in distribution networks, particularly if the device 
requires a recovery period.  The issues with DG fault ride-
through, auto-reclosure schemes, and transformer inrush are 
described.  Islanding may have a role to play in the practical 
and economical use of resistive SFCLs.  The case study has 
shown how islanding could help mitigate the recovery time 
during certain faults, and help mitigate the problem of 
transformer inrush.  Automation schemes could also be used 
to temporarily manipulate the system topology to reduce the 
fault level, such that, ideally, all DG remains in service and 
all loads are supplied while an SFCL recovers.  Modelling of 
typical SFCL operation and recovery time characteristics is 
needed in future studies to better understand the interaction 
between SFCLs and protection and control schemes. 
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